The present research Paper is authored by Mr Vedant Nandkumar Wadshingkar, a final-year student at Government Law College, Mumbai.
The Prelude:
Contrary to the prevalent populist notion that considers the tariffs episode as quite recent, the entire spell harks back to 2017, when Trump tried to clamp down on Chinese imports.[1] Once back in office, Trump has pursued the job left undone during his 1st term by issuing a slew of Executive Orders. The crusade commenced with the imposition of ‘Trafficking Tariffs’, which were thrust on Canada, China and Mexico,[2] and reached its pinnacle with Executive Order 14257. There's been no turning back since then, as each passing day has substantially revamped the tariff structure – either by altering or amending existing executive orders or by issuing a de novo tariff structure. The scope of the action has been so enormous that it has nudged friends and foes equally to mitigate the toll of the tariffs. Despite multiple rounds of negotiation, the situation has not been very promising for most of the trade partners. While on the one hand, partners like Japan and the EU managed to secure the deal with the USA, long-standing partners like India and Brazil have faced the wrath of the Trump administration with additional tariffs due to their alleged purchase of Russian oil and the political prosecution of the former President, respectively.[3]
In this entire tariff saga, irrespective of how erratic and lackadaisical the White House has been in issuing executive orders, one thread runs common in all executive orders - invocation of National Emergency under a slew of laws to justify imposition of tariffs. This brings us to our primary question: Does the legal framework to which the executive orders resort permit the proclamation of a National Emergency, & if yes, to what degree?
2. The Legal Labyrinth:
Section 8 of Article I of the US Constitution is couched in such a manner that it not only authorises Congress to levy tariffs but also enables it to regulate trade and commerce.[4] . In short, the President cannot, by itself, alter the tariffs unless any statute provides for the same. On the other hand, Section 2 of Article II, which entails the presidential powers, is confined only to the treaty-making power of the president.[5] Thus, the plain reading of the Constitution suggests that it is Congress that decides matters related to tariffs, and not the president.
However, multiple pieces of delegated legislation were passed in the 20th and 21st centuries by Congress, whereby the authority to determine the trade-related aspects was transferred to the President. From the Tariff Act of 1930 to the recent Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, the passage of each act only bestowed upon the President additional powers.[6] Thus, the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of, 1977, the National Emergency Act, 1976 or the Trade Act, 1974 are some of the statutes frequently invoked in the executive orders, along with the relevant sections of the U.S. Code, to justify the National Emergency.[7]
This delegation of essential legislative function was challenged in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, wherein the plaintiffs questioned the authority of the President to reinstate tariffs on otherwise duty-free items under the Tariff Act of 1890. Plaintiffs argued that by delegating the essential legislative function to the President, Congress transgressed the sacrosanct doctrine of separation of powers. However, the Supreme Court did not find any merit in this contention.[8] Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. V. United States, again confirmed the presidential authority to impose the duties on certain imports under the Tariff Act of 1922.[9]
Interestingly, though the Court upheld the presidential authorities in these cases, the Court's observation warrants closer attention. Despite acknowledging the inherent limitations of congressional delegation of legislative power in favour of the President, the Court validated the exercise of power because it did not involve a determination on the part of the President. The Court held that the powers were already prescribed by Congress, and the President was merely authorised to trigger these provisions upon satisfaction of certain conditions. It did not in any way authorise Congress to delegate the essential legislative power to the President.
To sum it up, apparently, the authority of the President under Section 604 of the Trade Act, 1974[10] or under Section 203(a)(1)(B) of the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, 1977 or under any statute, cannot be contested as long as the President acts within the scope, if the above precedents are considered.[11] Though it will be interesting to see whether any of the statutes, especially IEEPA, allow the President to increase tariffs to such an astronomical degree.
2.2. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. V. Trump: Misuse of Presidential Authority?
The legal origin of the presidential exercise of Trafficking Tariffs, as well as the Reciprocal Tariffs, lies in section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA.[12] Once a National Emergency is declared due to an extraordinary or unusual threat to the economy pursuant to the National Emergencies Act, Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA opens up multiple avenues for the President. It is truly perplexing that the section to so enormous yet does not mention anything about tariffs.
Though the words like ‘Regulate…. Exportation and Importation’ do feature in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA; however, it is difficult to assume that the term regulation would entail such sweeping powers. The Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have rightfully interpreted that the regulation does not mean a wide imposition of tariffs by relying on Gibbons v. Ogden, the case wherein it was held that the power to impose is different from that power to regulate.[13]
The fact that more than 50 years have passed since its inception, yet the IEEPA statute has not once been invoked to impose tariffs like President Trump did, is kind of unusual. Sure, its predecessor, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, was once invoked by President Nixon in 1971 to address the Balance of payments issue. However, the tariffs were hiked in a manner not to exceed the existing Tariff Schedules of the United States, and yet the said structure lasted only for a couple of months.[14]
Despite the ephemeral nature of the order, the United States Customs Courts held that the President is incompetent to act and exceeded his authority granted under Section 5(b) of the TWEA, when Yoshida International challenged the tariffs & sought the refund of the monies paid. Although the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals reversed the Customs Courts’ decision, it never acknowledged that TWEA created unfettered authority in favour of the President apropos of the revision in the tariff schedule. It only validated the temporary exercise without breaching the tariff rates approved by Congress[15].
The judicial principles established through these precedents were duly factored in when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dealt with the appeal of the government against the decision of the Court of International Trade (in the case of V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump). The Appellate Court rejected the government's contention that broad discretion should be given to the government while dealing with international matters. Relying on the Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., the Court held that the executive is not free from checks and balances of Congress simply because it is acting in a sphere of international affairs.[16] Reiterating what is being stated in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky vs Kerry, the Court also claimed that the power of the purse, including the prerogative to tax, belongs to Congress. Absent express delegation, exercise of authority by the President is null & void.[17]
After thoroughly deliberating on the merits of the case, ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the CIT; however, it vacated the interim permanent injunction granted. Due regard must be given to the fact that CIT did not grant the permanent injunction in its initial order, as the same was issued based on the criteria discussed in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange shortly afterwards.[18]
It is interesting to note that both CIT and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not discuss whether existing conditions on economic grounds are sufficient to invoke an emergency or not. Though the Federal Circuit Court summarily highlighted conditions, it did not delve deeper into them. This raises a critical question of presidential authority pertaining to the declaration of emergency. Does the emergency jurisprudence in the US bestow absolute discretion on the president, or can fetters be imposed on the exercise of power?
3. Emergency Jurisprudence: prerequisites to fulfil
The emergency jurisprudence in the US derives from statutes, unlike the Indian Constitution, which explicitly provides for multifarious emergencies.[19] It is rather astonishing that the National Emergencies Act, 1976 neither defines ‘Emergency’ nor specifies the grounds on which an emergency can be proclaimed. Barring a few procedural aspects, the law does little to address the constituent elements of an emergency.
Although the contours of the term ‘National Emergency’ cannot be precisely demarcated, we can nonetheless advance the rudimentary idea of the same. The Supreme Court in the case of Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell interpreted emergency in terms of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence, as well as its equivalence to a public calamity that cannot be reasonably anticipated.[20] Furthermore, debates of the Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency also shed light on the term ‘Emergency’. Dr Cotter identified the existence of conditions that suddenly intensify the degree of existing danger to life and well-being, which is beyond normal, akin to an emergency. Elaborating further, he asserted that the emergency is relative to intensity, variety and perception. Another eminent scholar, Corwin, opined on the emergency in terms of conditions that have not attained enough stability or recurrence, wherein we can admit that such conditions have been dealt with in accordance with the rule.[21]
Even the CRS report on National Emergency Powers has roughly identified four key aspects of emergency: temporal character, potential gravity, role of the governmental authority, and element of response.[22] What needs to be tested now is: does the prevailing situation warrant the proclamation of a national emergency, based on existing literature?
3.1 The National Emergency: Sham Pretext or Genuine Concern?
White House believes that the trade tariffs and non-trade barriers, non-reciprocal trade relationships, artificial suppression of consumption through infringement of labour laws and burgeoning trade deficits constitute a threat to national security, and are sufficient enough to invoke the National Emergency.[23] To assess the strength of these contentions, it is essential to examine the veracity of these assertions.
Regardless of how the entire episode has unfolded, we cannot overlook the trade protectionism that exists in developing and underdeveloped countries. A cursory glance at the WTO Tariff Profiles 2025 proves that White House’s frustration isn’t unfounded. For instance, a comparison between tariff profiles of the USA and India offers striking revelations. In contrast to the MFN simple weighted average tariff of 3.3% which the USA levies on imports, India charges a staggering 16.7% tariff on imports. This divide widens further if we consider the agricultural products, as India notoriously applies a 39% tariff on them.[24] The situation is more or less similar to almost every major trading partner of the USA.
When labour and consumption suppression is concerned, rapid strides of some of the East Asian countries warrant attention. The initial surge in these nations can be attributed to the internationalisation and globalisation of trade through global supply chains.[25] These countries relied on large industries that catered extensively to export markets. As domestic demand for such goods was either relatively low or near non-existent, to remain price-competitive, wages were deliberately kept low. Growth of countries like China, Thailand and Malaysia in the initial decades lends credence to this.[26] Research shows that countries that are involved in the production of high-value intermediate goods derive more benefit than those that are involved in the production of low-value goods.[27] As these countries, especially China, transitioned to the production of high-value goods, wages showed a relative increase. However, as wages increased in these countries, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa emerged as substitute manufacturing hubs. As the manufacturing in these substitute emergent manufacturing hubs (South Asian and Sub-Saharan Countries) is skewed in favour low low-tech or resource-based industries, which are infamous for labour-intensive practices, wages are usually low.[28] However, we cannot straightaway conclude that the low wages are a deliberate phenomenon. What is often overlooked is the complex assortment of factors, including distorted supply-demand labour dynamics, prevalence of the informal sector, persistent education-occupation mismatch[29] and limited scientific and technological development.[30]
A thorough analysis of outsourcing and sweatshop literature reveals, in fact, disturbing trends. Despite disparate working conditions and low wages, wages offered in so-called sweatshops are better than other existing wages (wages offered in establishments other than sweatshops) in these countries.[31] Thus, the argument that countries are proactively pursuing policies of consumption suppression to maintain trade surplus may seem worthwhile initially, but it lacks logical consistency.
All these sub-issues are clubbed together to conclude that the total of these factors contributes to mounting Fiscal Deficit. The orchestrated narrative often ascribes the blame for this fiscal deficit to international factors. However, upon closer inspection, it becomes evident that factors like easy financial conditions, a real estate bubble,[32] domestic fiscal and monetary policy, and skyrocketed foreign safe asset demand[33] have equally contributed to the fiscal deficit. No doubt the international factors have their own share in the rising deficit levels, but so do the domestic variables.[34] Putting the entire onus on international factors, thus, may reap short-term electoral dividends, but if the White House is serious about curbing the fiscal deficit, it would be prudent to consider the whole landscape.
Ultimately, if we gauge these conditions against the four aspects of emergency as discussed earlier, many of the grey spots emerge. The temporal character, in other words, means the concerned situation should be sudden, unforeseen and of infinite duration. The proclamation of a Financial National Emergency based on the grounds enumerated in the Executive Order apparently does not fulfil the criteria, as the fiscal deficits have been on a steady rise since the 1980s, and the way it has unfurled makes it evident that it cannot be considered as unforeseen in any possible scenario.[35] When the gravity of the situation is considered, it is quite perplexing how the said conditions can be considered life-threatening, especially since consumers have largely benefited from the extant situation[1]. As far as the need for an immediate, unanticipated and effective response is considered, evidence shows that immediate action of imposing tariffs, at best, can cause real currency appreciation but won’t rein in the odyssey of deficits.[2][36] Thus, assuming that the extant situation fulfils the four aspects of National Emergency would be an ambiguous proposition, if not entirely erroneous.
Although this comparative analysis does not support the proclamation of a National Emergency on financial grounds, considering how equivocal the entire jurisprudence has been in this matter, it becomes important to evaluate whether the tariffs can be considered as a panacea to this issue.
3.3. High Tariffs: Tribute to Adam Smith?
In the labyrinth of pro-tariffs & anti-tariffs debate, it is easy to lose sight of the fundamental economic principles that determine whether tariffs can be beneficial or detrimental. The rationale behind imposing tariffs is quite straightforward. Proponents of the tariff run on the assumption that steep duties on imports will disincentivise consumers, who will prefer domestically manufactured goods, thereby providing impetus to sluggish manufacturing.[37] It is assumed that as manufacturing gains traction, unemployment will be curtailed. However, this assumption defies the principle of the Symmetry theorem advanced by A. P. Lerner.[38] Although tariffs may increase the demand for domestically produced import substitutes, much of this initial surge must be met by goods that would have been exported otherwise. Even Robert Mundell corroborates this conclusion, as the currency appreciation due to the tariffs deters imports and exports equally, thereby wiping out the slim possibility of any gain in trade balance.[39]
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, advised that it is always prudent to buy a particular commodity if it is produced efficiently and cheaply elsewhere rather than allocating scarce resources to production.[40] Diversion of capital where it would otherwise not have gone always results in a diminution of total commodities produced. Another prominent economist, David Ricardo, another distinguished economist, rightfully identified that such tariffs equally affect even manufacturers, as they, like consumers, also pay the additional cost for imports.[41] Milton and Rose Friedman, in their book Free to Choose, aptly describe this folly of protecting domestic manufacturers.[3] The gains that some producers may incur from duties and tariffs are usually offset by the losses to other producers and ultimately to consumers. Thus, it would be naïve to assume that tariffs will automatically solve all the issues the US economy is currently facing. Although we are fairly acquainted with the issues, at this point, it is equally important to examine whether there is any remedy for this conundrum.
4. Way Forward: Concluding Remarks
Although the media is abuzz with its analysis of the issue, solutions rarely feature in discussions. Fortunately, there still exist approaches rooted in legal and economic grounds via which the situation can be resolved. However, before we examine these approaches, the construct of reciprocity needs to be examined, as many things will be contingent on whether said tariffs breach any international commitment or not.
4.1. Myth of Reciprocity:
Narratives have attempted to advertise the tariffs as reciprocal; however, there is hardly anything reciprocal about them. Though the vis-à-vis comparison of tariff profiles does not reflect reciprocity, it would be wrong to assume that there is any breach of international rules, especially the WTO mandate, on the part of US trading partners. For instance, the Simple Average Final Bound for India and the USA at the WTO is respectively 50.8% and 3.4%. To simplify, this means Indian tariffs do not infringe upon any international law as long as they stay within the threshold of 50.8%.[42] The USA, on the other hand, apparently has breached its international commitment by imposing tariffs over and above the limits it has submitted to the WTO.
Furthermore, there are certain provisions in the WTO agreements that allow extra privileges to certain members over others. These privileges are nothing but the Special and Differential Treatment provisions, which inter alia include a longer gestation period for implementation and honouring commitments, increased trading opportunities, as well as infrastructural and technical assistance.[43] In fact, the enabling clause of the S&DT does not require developing countries to commit to full reciprocity in their commitments.[44] Furthermore, Article XVIII & Article XXXVI of the GATT 1994 explicitly state that the developed countries do not expect reciprocity in their commitments arising out of trade negotiations with the less-developed nations.[45] Thus, the US does not have at least the moral authority to complain about the reciprocity when they themselves have flouted the very norms.
Once this distorted veil of reciprocity is pierced, the affected party can proceed in two different ways to seek the remedy. The 1st approach allows sovereign nation-states to take action against an errant country at the international forum, while the 2nd approach enables the affected parties to individually proceed against such orders.
4.2. WTO & beyond: Dysfunctional Dilemma of Dispute Resolution?
Under the former approach, countries can either bilaterally resolve the issue among themselves, or they can submit their dispute for formal adjudication. As far as the latter option is concerned, the dispute settlement system of the WTO would have been an ideal and a go-to option for the aggrieved nation if any nation fails to honour its agreement or commitment made in the WTO.[46]
However, the system, which was once touted as the most effective mechanism, is now almost dysfunctional as the USA itself has withheld the appointments to the Appellate Body.[47] This has brought not only the Appellate Body but the entire dispute mechanism to its knees, as under the DSU (Article 16.4), any contested panel report becomes legally binding only after the Appellate Body decides on the same.[48]
Fortunately, some attempts are being made to revive the dispute settlement system through initiatives like the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration, wherein parties have mutually agreed to utilise appellate arbitration under Article 25 to appeal instead of resorting to the dysfunctional Appellate Body.[49] In fact, in the Colombia- Frozen Fries case (DS591), parties even agreed in good faith not to prolong the dispute further.[50] However, these initiatives bank more on the political will and cannot substitute a formal, legally binding arrangement. History is replete with such instances, wherein the initiatives, like the Walker Process, which endeavoured to establish alternative arrangements, were stymied by the US.[51] Although the Molina Process is still underway, without US active participation, this impasse is bound to persist.[52] Thus, despite its immense potential, the limited scope of the formal adjudication leaves countries no other alternative but to negotiate bilaterally. Deals signed with Japan[53] and the European Union further add weight to this hypothesis.[54]
4.3. Court of International Trade: Glimmer of Hope?
As far as the individual actions of the aggrieved parties are concerned, domestic judicial forums can offer respite. In the case of Cornet Stores v. Morton,[55] it was held that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has jurisdiction regarding any trade-related Presidential Order, especially those orders whereby any tariff or surcharge is levied on imports. Since the Customs Court has now been replaced by the Court of International Trade, consumers as well as producers aggrieved by any trade-related diktats can directly approach the International Court of Trade. Those aggrieved by the CIT order can appeal to the Courts of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. [56] As far as CIT’s record with tariff-related matters is concerned, its approach is highly context-specific. In U.S. Cane Sugars Refiners Association v. Block,[57] the court acted in a somewhat activist fashion to grant the relief to the plaintiff. Whereas in Michael Simon Design Inc v United States, CIT stuck to the reserved approach.[58]
Despite its context-specific approach, it is encouraging to see that CIT in V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump has ruled that the President lacks the authority to arbitrarily determine the tariff rates. Even the appeal filed in the Court of the Federal Circuit has failed to materialise for the Government, as the Appellate Court has upheld CIT's order.[59] Soon, the ball will be in the Supreme Court, and only time will determine the legality of the tariffs.
4.4. The Great Folly of Infant Industry
Despite being cognizant of the limited efficacy of the tariffs, the proponents, however, have left no stone unturned to prove how tariffs can work wonders. The Infant Industry argument advanced by Alexander Hamilton is one such instance.[60] However, failure of any nation to make strides in a particular domain largely seems like ordinary risks of business. If the firms do not complain about unusual or accidental windfall gains, they have no reason to grumble about the business opportunities that are lost. Similarly, the national interest argument, which is frequently cited and even recognised by the likes of Adam Smith, is no exception, as the security grounds merely rationalise tariffs rather than justifying them.
4.5. From Retaliation to the De Minimis
While retaliation may seem a tempting action, the WTO dispute settlement body allows full retaliation as well as cross-retaliation under Article 22 if no agreement on compensation is reached between the parties.[61] However, this is an extreme action, and noted economists, including Adam Smith, have warned against retaliation. Smith rightfully quotes that when a crafty animal like a politician operates to give benefits to the few at the cost of the others, the probability that such a talisman will end such protection is very low. No doubt that retaliation is just another way of seeking compensation by inflicting the same kind on our own people by limiting their purchasing power.[62] Thus, it is disheartening to see that consumers have to suffer just because the adamant proponents of the tariffs are not willing to see anything beyond their vested interests. Tariff proponents openly claim that increased trade relations with specific countries like China have a net negative effect on the US regions more specialised in manufacturing, and validly so. However, the positive impact it brought on the regions more specialised in agriculture and services is something the torchbearers of trade protectionism have failed to see, either inadvertently or deliberately.[63] It is a no-brainer that the consumption gains from free trade benefit the poorer section. Not only in the emerging economies but also in the developed countries like Switzerland, it has been documented that low tariffs usually benefit low-income households. [64]
When more than 4 trillion dollars of goods that the US imports account for nearly 14% of the economy, the approach should have been more cautious, because such arbitrary tariffs can equally harm your nation. No doubt all these suggestions, including domestic as well as international ones, are time-consuming and can be categorised as broad and long-term measures. However, in the short run and as an immediate measure, at least duty-free De Minimis treatment under 321(a)(2)(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930 should be allowed, as the direct-to-consumer US imports exempted under the De Minimis rule benefited poor households mainly.[65]
To conclude, in usual circumstances, a collaborative approach rooted in shared respect and willingness to compromise would have succeeded. Unfortunately, we are dealing with the new US, which has shown utter disdain towards diplomacy and negotiations that led to a win-win situation for all. When the winner-takes-all approach is so ingrained in the ruling regime, even the plight of your own citizens can take a backseat. Considering this blatant overreach of presidential authority, the remarks of the Founding Fathers of the constitution assume manifold importance. In the debates of several state conventions, when Patrik henry once raised concern about presidential overreach, James Madison assured him by saying that it would not occur, as the purse is in the hands of the representatives of the people.[66] It seems like the purse is no longer in the hands of the representatives of the people!
[1]Reuters, ‘Timeline: Key Dates in the US–China Trade War’ (Reuters, 17 January 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/business/timeline-key-dates-in-the-us-china-trade-war-idUSKBN1ZE1AA/ accessed 17 September 2025.
[2] Executive Order No 14194, 90 Fed Reg 9117 (7 February 2025); Executive Order No 14193, 90 Fed Reg 8327 (1 February 2025); Executive Order No 14195, 90 Fed Reg 9113 (1 February 2025).
[3] Executive Order No 14345, 90 Fed Reg 43535 (9 September 2025); Executive Order No 14257, 90 Fed Reg 15041 (7 April 2025); Executive Order No. 14,329, 90 Fed. Reg. 56,123 (11 August 2025); Executive
Order 14323, 90 Fed Reg 37739 (30 July 2025).
[4] US Const art I, § 8.
[5] US Const art II, § 2.
[6] The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 USC §§1202-1683g; Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub L No 114-26, 129 Stat 319.
[7] International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub L No 95-223, 91 Stat 1625(1977) (codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1701-1707 (2018)) [hereinafter IEEPA]. ; National Emergencies Act, Pub L No 94-412, 90 Stat 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1601-1651 (2018)) [hereinafter National Emergencies Act of 1974].; Trade Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-618, 88 Stat 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 USC § 2481 (2018)) [hereinafter Trade Act of 1974].
[8] Marshall Field & Co v Clark, 143 US 649 (1892).
[9] J W Hampton Jr & Co V United States, 276 US 394 (1928).
[10] Trade Act of 1974 (n 7), § 601.
[11] IEEPA (n 7), Section 203(a)(1)(B).
[12] IEEPA (n 7), Section 1702(a)(1)(B).
[13] Gibbons v Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
[14] Christopher A Casey, Elsea K. Jennifer, ‘The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use’, (Congressional Research Service Report No R45618) (30 January 2024) < https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45618 > accessed 15 September 2025.
[15] United States v Yoshida Int’l Inc, 526 F 2d 560, 571 (CCPA 1975)
[16] Fuld v. Pal Liberation Org, 606 US 1, 19 (2025).
[17] Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky vs Kerry, 576 US 1, 21 (2015).
[18] eBay Inc v MercExchange, LLC., 547 US 388, 391 (2006).
[19] Constitution of India 1950, Part XVIII, art 352-360.
[20] Home Building and Loan Association v Blaisdell, 290 US 398 (1934).
[21] US Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, Part I: Constitutional Questions Concerning Emergency Powers: Hearings Before the Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, 93rd Congress (1973).
[22] Webster & M Elizabeth, ‘National Emergency Powers’ Congressional Research Service Report No 98-505 19 November, 2021), < https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/98-505 > accessed 15 September 2025.
[23] Executive Order No 14257 (n 3).
[24] World Trade Organization, International Trade Centre & United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, World Tariff Profiles 2025, < https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world_tariff_profiles25_e.htm > accessed 16 September 2025.
[25] John Weiss, Export Growth and Industrial Policy: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle experience (Asian Development Bank Discussion Paper No 26), < https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156779/adbi-dp26.pdf > accessed 16 September 2025.
[26] Engelbert Stockhammer and Ozlem Onaran, Wage-led growth: Theory, Evidence, Policy (Political Economy Research Institute, Working Paper Series No 300, 2012) < http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP300.pdf > accessed 16 September 2025.
[27] Robert Koopman, William Powers, Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei, Give Credit Where Credit is Due: Tracing Value Added in Global Production Chains (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No 16426, 2010) < https://www.nber.org/papers/w16426 > accessed 16 September 2025.
[28] Anil Hira, Alessandro Sanches Pereira, Kweku Attafuah-Wadee, Amir Rashid and others, ‘Shifting to Circular Manufacturing in the Global South: Challenges and Pathways’, (2022) 38(3) Journal of Developing Societies, 310.
[29] S. Bahl and A Sharma, ‘Informality, Education-occupation mismatch and Wages: Evidence from India’ (2023) 56 (19) Applied Economics, 2260 < https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00036846.2023.2186364?scroll=top&needAccess=true >accessed 15 September 2025.
[30] Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty (Crown Publishers, New York, 2012)
[31] S H Park, K Lundquist and others, ‘Global Value Chains for Exclusive Development’ in the University of International business and Economics, World Trade Organization and others(eds), Global Value Chain Development Report 2023: Resilient and sustainable GVCs in Turbulent Times (2023).
[32] R G Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, (Princeton University Press 2010) accessed 16 September 2025.
[33] Zhengyang Jiang, A Krishnamurthy & Hanno Lustig, ‘Foreign Safe Asset Demand and the Dollar Exchange Rate’, (2021)76(3) Journal of Finance 1049-1089.
[34] Mah-Hui Lim, Globalization, Export-Led Growth and Inequality: The East Asian Story (South Centre Research Paper No 57, 2014) < https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-57-november-2014/ > accessed 10 September 2025.
[35] Council on Foreign Relations, The U.S. Trade Deficit: How Much Does it Matter? (23 April 2025), < https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-trade-deficit-how-much-does-it-matter#chapter-title-0-4 > accessed 17 September 2025.
[36] D Furceri, J D Ostry, Andrew Rose and others, ‘The Macroeconomy after Tariffs’ (2022) 36(2) The World Bank Economic Review 361-381.
[37] David G Tarr, On the Design of Tariff Policy: A Practical Guide to the Arguments for and Against Uniform Tariffs (World Bank Group Working Paper Report no 111992, 2000)
[38] A P Lerner, ‘The Symmetry between Import & Export Taxes’ (1936) 3(11) Economia 306.
[39] Robert Mundell, ‘Flexible Exchange Rates & Employment Policy’ (1961) 27(4) The Canadian Journal of Economics & Political Science 509.
[40] Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, (W Strahan and T Cadell 1776) Book IV, Chapter II.
[41] David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (Piero Sraffa ed, Clarendon Press 1951) Chapter 22.
[42] World Trade Organization, International Trade Centre & United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, World Tariff Profiles 2025, (n 24).
[43] World Trade Organization, ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ < https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/status_e/sdt_e.htm#:~:text=The%20WTO%20agreements%20contain%20special,%2Ddeveloped%20country%20(LDC)%20members > accessed 11 September 2025.
[44] Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (28 November 1979) GATT Doc L/4903, 26 BISD 203 (1980).
[45] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, (15 April 1994), 1867 UNTS 187, art XVIII & XXXVI.
[46] World Trade Organization, ‘The Process - Stages in a typical WTO dispute Settlement’ < https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm > accessed 17th September 2025.
[47] Ravi Dutta Mishra, ‘US blocks fresh proposal to restart dispute settlement mechanism at WTO’ (Indian Express, 28 January 2024) < https://indianexpress.com/article/business/us-blocks-fresh-proposal-to-restart-dispute-settlement-mechanism-at-wto-9130754/ > accessed 19 September 2025.
[48] Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (15 April 1994) Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1126(1994) Art 16.4.
[49] Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (n 48), Art 25.
[50] Colombia – Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Fries from Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, WTO Doc WT/DS591/AB/R (Panel Report).
[51] Informal Process on matters related to the functioning of the Appellate Body- Report by the Facilitator, H.E. Dr David Walker (New Zealand), WTO Doc JOB/GC/22 (15 October 2019).
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[56] 28 USCS 1295(a)(5).
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